

THE YEARS 375 TO 371 BC: A CASE STUDY IN THE RELIABILITY OF DIODORUS SICULUS AND XENOPHON

Neither the chronology nor the interpretation of the history of the years 375 to 371 BC is yet settled.¹ The date of the peace that followed the Athenian naval victory over Sparta at Alyzeia in Scirophorion 375 is put variously in the second half of 375 or 374 or even in spring 374.² The status of the Boeotian cities at the time of the peace as well as the role of the King and the participation of Thebes are controversial, and this affects the interpretation of the peace itself.³ The order of the subsequent expeditions to Corcyra by Sparta and Athens under the command of Mnasippus and Timotheus, which broke the peace and renewed the war, is still debated, and various dates are given for Mnasippus' expedition, although Timotheus' sailing in Mounichion 373 is firmly fixed.⁴ The date of the expedition of Iphicrates who succeeded Timotheus is also controversial.⁵

The controversies arise from the irreconcilable disagreements between Xenophon and Diodorus Siculus, the two main sources for the period, so that the question of the relative reliability of their respective accounts must be settled before the debate can be resolved. The most recent attempt at such an assessment concentrates mainly on the peace and the deficiencies of Xenophon's account.⁶ No detailed assessment of Diodorus' account of the period has been made and his evidence is sometimes accepted or dismissed without good reason, as where, to take a minor example, he mentions the two expeditions of Ctesicles (15.46.3 and 47.4); the first of these is dismissed as a doublet of the other in spite of the

¹ Compare the recent general accounts of H. Bengtson, *Griechische Geschichte*, (Munich, 1969), p. 276 and R. Sealey, *A History of the Greek City States 700-338 BC* (Berkeley, 1976), pp. 414-19, who outlines the controversies of the period and seems to conclude that a solution depends on the relative reliability of the two main sources for the period: Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 6.1-3 and Diodorus Siculus 15.38-50. All unmarked references in the text are to the *Hellenica*.

² For a survey on the various views of the peace up to 1949 see A. Roos, 'The Peace of Sparta of 374 BC', *Mnemosyne*, N.S. ii (1949), 266 n. 1. More recent historians favour a date of 375/4: G. L. Cawkwell, 'Notes on the Peace of 375 BC', *Hist.* 12 (1963), 84-95; T. T. Ryder, *Koine Eirene* (Oxford, 1965), pp. 58-63, 124-6; Bengtson and Sealey (above, n. 1). For the date of Alyzeia, Polyaeus 3, 10.

³ G. Grote, *History of Greece IX* (London, 1884), pp. 348-91, follows Xenophon in holding that the Boeotian cities were in Theban hands before the peace; N. G. L. Hammond, *History of*

Greece (Oxford, 1959), pp. 490-1 excepts Orchomenus from this generalization; K. J. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte* III. 1 (Berlin, 1922), pp. 154-60 and M. Cary in *CAH VI* (Cambridge, 1923), p. 70, except Plataea, Thespiae, Orchomenus; S. Accame, *La Lega Ateniese* (Rome, 1941), pp. 86-106 and esp. 146, excepts Tanagra as well. The role of Persia and Thebes is less controversial; see Roos and Ryder (n. 2).

⁴ On the date of Mnasippus' expedition some favour spring 373: Grote, Cary, and Hammond (above, n. 3) and J. Marshall, *The Second Athenian Confederacy* (Cambridge, 1905), pp. 64-71; but others favour autumn 373: Beloch and Accame (above, n. 3) and Cawkwell (above, n. 2). Timotheus' expedition is fixed at Mounichion 373 by Ps.-Dem. 49.6.

⁵ Grote and Cary have a date of summer 373 for Iphicrates' expedition (above, n. 3) but Marshall, Beloch, Accame, Hammond, and Cawkwell (above, nn. 2-4) have a date of early 372.

⁶ Cawkwell (above, n. 2).

fact that the destinations and the troops involved in each case are different. Admittedly, on points where Diodorus' evidence is corroborated by a good source there is no need for such an assessment, but where he is the sole source there is a need and it must be met. I also believe that a reconsideration of Xenophon's account is required. It seems to me plausible and internally consistent, in spite of recent allegations to the contrary.

War had broken out between Sparta and Thebes in 379/8 and Athens had joined Thebes. Sparta invaded Thebes annually until 376 but from this date turned her attention to the sea against Athens, and during these years Thebes began to recover Boeotia. In 376 the Athenians defeated the Spartan navy off Naxos and in 375 Timotheus was sent around the Peloponnese to Corcyra and the North-West. Later in that year he defeated the Spartan navy off Alyzeia. It is from this point in Xenophon's narrative that his alleged chronological deficiencies arise.

His order of events is as follows:

- (i) Timotheus defeats the Spartan fleet off Alyzeia
- (ii) Thebes invades Phocis, having recovered the Boeotian cities, and Sparta sends an army to the area
- (iii) Polydamas of Pharsalus in Thessaly appeals to Sparta against the threat of Jason; he is rejected and Jason becomes leader of Thessaly
- (iv) peace is concluded between Athens and Sparta
- (v) Timotheus is ordered back to Athens and lands a group of exiles at Zacynthus on his way
- (vi) Sparta immediately decides that this is a breach of the peace and sends Mnasiippus against Corcyra, an Athenian ally
- (vii) the Corcyreans appeal to Athens which sends Ctesicles with 600 peltasts to their aid and votes to equip a fleet of 60 under the command of Timotheus
- (viii) Timotheus does not sail directly to Corcyra but to the islands and is deposed; Iphicrates is sent out instead
- (ix) peace is concluded again between Athens, Sparta, and the other Greeks excluding Thebes

I: THE PEACE

Xenophon's order of events from the battle of Alyzeia to the peace (i)–(iv) suggests that the peace followed very closely on the battle, that is later in 375. He indicates that the Theban invasion of Phocis occurred at about the same time as the fighting between Athens and Sparta and after Thebes had recovered the Boeotian cities, a process that began in 376 and continued in 375 (*Hell.* 5.4.63). The sentence that introduces the section on the invasion of Phocis is of a framing type found quite often in the *Hellenica* from 2.3.10.⁷ It is used to round off one section of the narrative before passing to another and usually connects contemporaneous events; where there is a lapse of time it is Xenophon's habit to indicate this by the use of a phrase like *μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο* after the framing

⁷ For a list of such framing sentences see M. McLaren, 'On the Composition of

Xenophon's *Hellenica*', *AJP* 55 (1934), 131 n. 42.

sentence, as at *Hell.* 3.2.31/3.3.1 and 3.3.11/3.4.1. In this case the formula is like that found at *Hell.* 3.4.25/4.1.1, 4.2.1, and 4.8.19/20 and indicates contemporaneous or prior action.⁸ This seems to be good evidence that Xenophon believes the invasion of Phocis was indeed contemporary with the fighting at Alyzeia.

Xenophon then says that Polydamas appealed to Sparta at about this time *σχεδὸν δὲ περὶ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον*; after he was rejected Pharsalus submitted immediately and Jason swiftly became *tagos* of Thessaly. Although Xenophon marks a digression at 6.1.19 it applies only to the story of Jason's actions subsequent to his assumption of the leadership, which are described in 6.1.19. He then returns to the situation in Phocis saying that peace was initiated and concluded while the Spartans and their allies were gathering in Phocis and the Thebans had retired to their borders (6.2.1). Again the year 375 is indicated.

Thus Xenophon's narrative suggests a date of 375 for the peace. This is supported by Isocrates who connects the peace closely to the battle,⁹ although in a speech so apologetic in tone as the *Antidosis* one must be wary. Diodorus also dates the peace to 375/4. His dates are notoriously suspect because he is assumed to be adapting a basically non-annalistic source to an annalistic framework,¹⁰ but where the rest of the evidence supports them there is no need for suspicion. No contradiction arises. The date seems to be later in 375.

However, Xenophon's narrative subsequent to the peace has led many to date the peace to 374 rather than 375 since he implies that very little time passed between the peace and the expedition of Timotheus which took place in early 373. Moreover, the events he recounts do not seem sufficient to cover the period of almost two years that would have intervened had the peace occurred in 375. He links the conclusion of peace very closely to the fresh outbreak of war signalled by the dispatch of the Spartan commander Mnasippus to Corcyra: Timotheus is ordered home to Athens immediately after the conclusion of peace; he lands the exiles at Zacynthus on his way, obviously still soon after the peace; the citizens of Zacynthus appeal to Sparta which immediately decides there has been a breach of the peace; a fleet and a force of mercenaries are gathered, occupying perhaps a month or two; Mnasippus sets sail and besieges Corcyra. This implies a date near 375 for Mnasippus, if the peace occurred at that time. But then Xenophon links Mnasippus' expedition closely to Timotheus' in early 373, which seems to rule out a peace date in 375: the Corcyrean appeal against Mnasippus could not be long delayed; Athens sends out Ctesicles straight away and Timotheus and the fleet follow shortly afterwards. These close links between the peace and Mnasippus' expedition, and Mnasippus' and Timotheus' expedition would make best sense if the peace were dated to 374.

But Xenophon is wrong in connecting Mnasippus' expedition so closely to the Zacynthian affair. Diodorus provides information on military activity at Zacynthus and Corcyra which suggests a gap of some time between the two

⁸ It is clear that the formula can indicate prior action; see *Hell.* 3.1.1 where it introduces the expedition of Cyrus which began in early 401 after the account of the stasis at Athens which ended later that year (*Ath. Pol.* 40.4).

⁹ Isocrates 15.109–10.

¹⁰ D.S. 15.38. It is generally agreed that

Diodorus used Ephorus for Books 11–16: see C. A. Volquardsen, *Untersuchungen über die Quellen der griechen und sikilischen Geschichte bei Diodor XI–XVI* (1868). For the chronology of Ephorus and the difficulties Diodorus had in using him, cf. G. L. Barber, *The Historian Ephorus* (Cambridge, 1935), pp. 59–69, 171–2.

events, and it is unreasonable to reject it. The peace must have lasted longer than Xenophon suggests.

It has also been alleged against Xenophon that he has misdated the events between the battle of Alyzeia and the peace, and this casts doubt on the worth of any of his chronological implications. Beloch believed that he transferred the Theban invasion of Phocis and Polydamas' appeal, along with Jason's assumption of the leadership of Thessaly, from 371 where they rightfully belong to 375, repeating the invasion of Phocis in his narrative of 371.¹¹ Accame went further and alleged that these events were part of a digression inserted between the fighting at sea and the peace.¹² Both dated the peace to 375 on other grounds. Admittedly, on the invasion of Phocis, Xenophon's account does provoke suspicion since he does not say that the Spartan army under King Cleombrotus returned from the area after the peace nor does he mention that he was sent out again; when he refers to Cleombrotus again in Phocis (6.4.2) before the battle of Leuctra it seems as if he has been in the area with the same army ever since 375. Yet that is generally thought to be impossible. However, Xenophon's omissions are legend and could account for this particular feature.¹³ Moreover, Xenophon's narrative is elsewhere consistent with his implication that Thebes invaded Phocis in 375. At 5.4.60 he says the allies of Sparta suggested that Sparta should put a fleet on the sea and use this to besiege Athens and to transport an invading army to Thebes via Creusis or Phocis, in view of the difficulties of invading over Cithaeron. The Spartans carried out the first part of the suggestion (5.4.61) and were about to carry out the second (5.4.62) when they were prevented by Timotheus' *periplous*. It is not certain that they intended to invade via Phocis but this seems likely since they had already carried out the first part of the allies' programme. The Thebans would then have expected Sparta to invade the following year and might well have countered by marching into Phocis, just as Xenophon says, to forestall the possibility of Spartan invasion from that quarter. Sparta did in fact send an army to Phocis by sea but Thebes' previous invasion made this move less effective. Thebes retired to defend her borders and the Spartans did not invade. Xenophon's account is consistent and this makes it impossible to restrict his error just to his description of the invasion at 6.1.1.

Beloch also thought that the invasion was implausible because Thebes had not at that time recovered the Boeotian cities of Plataea, Thespieae, and Orchomenus, and it would have been dangerous to invade Phocis with Boeotia insecure. Xenophon himself (6.3.1) refers to Theban attacks on Plataea and Thespieae subsequent to 375. But once again Xenophon's account can be shown to be consistent since Thebes did in fact recover the Boeotian cities before the peace was made. He is very careful to mark the stages of the recovery, starting at 5.4.63 where he indicates the time it began, that is 376. He uses the imperfect tense to indicate a process not then complete, and then picks up the story of the recovery again at 6.1.1 referring to its completion with the aorist. His framing sentence indicates that this completion of the process was contemporary with the battle of Alyzeia. He clearly means us to understand that the Thebans had recovered the cities of Boeotia by the end of 375 and it seems impossible he

¹¹ Beloch, *Gr.G.* III.2, pp. 236–8.

¹² Accame (above, n. 3), pp. 91–8.

¹³ Ryder (above, n. 2), p. 125 has no trouble in accepting these omissions.

could say this if Plataea, Thespieae, and Orchomenus were still outside the Boeotian Confederacy and hostile to Thebes.

The information he gives on the cities of Boeotia during the Boeotian War is also consistent with a recovery of Boeotia by 375. Thespieae, for instance, was fraught with stasis like all the other cities (5.4.46) possibly between the hoplites who were strongly anti-Theban and the rest (5.4.45); and in spite of Spartan military presence this could have caused her to go over to Thebes in the two years, 376 and 375, in which Sparta failed to invade and help her supporters. Xenophon refers often to this sort of stasis and to the fact that many exiled democrats from these cities had sought shelter in Thebes (5.4.46, 55). A democratic reaction against the narrow oligarchies associated with Spartan control might well have shifted their alliance from Sparta to Thebes. There are other incidental references to the various cities' alliances: Plataea is described as still friendly to Sparta (5.4.14) and Tanagra as still held by the friends of Sparta (5.4.49); but these give the point of view of the Spartan commanders at the time and cannot be used as evidence for the cities' subsequent history.

Xenophon refers later to the Thebans driving the Plataeans from their city and threatening to make the Thespians stateless as well (6.3.1). There is another reference in a speech to the destruction of Plataea and Thespieae alike but that is an exaggeration (6.3.5); Pausanias (9.13.8) implies that the Thespians later fought at Leuctra, and Xenophon himself says that the Theban cavalry at Leuctra was well trained because of the war with the Thespians, and another with the men of Orchomenus (6.4.10). Clearly those wars were recent. These later references to Theban attacks on Boeotian cities contradict Xenophon's own statement at 6.1.1, if he means us to understand that the cities were here attacked for the first time. It is possible that he has exaggerated Theban success in Boeotia (6.1.1) at the expense of Sparta, but that would be uncharacteristic of him; he is usually considered to some degree Spartophile.¹⁴ It is also difficult to believe he has overlooked a contradiction of this sort in his narrative. Moreover, the theory that he has transferred Theban control of Boeotia in 371 to 375 and misdated their invasion of Phocis has less appeal when it is noted that Xenophon never says they invaded Phocis in 371. The two accounts do not form a true doublet.

It is possible to make sense of Xenophon's narrative in the following way. In 375 Thebes did indeed recover the Boeotian cities while Sparta was occupied in fighting Athens, but this was very short-lived since she was soon obliged to swear to the peace.¹⁵ Its terms meant that she had to withdraw all garrisons from Boeotia and give the cities their autonomy. Subsequently however, while Sparta and Athens were once again at war in the North-West around Corcyra, she re-incorporated the cities into her Confederacy, or destroyed them, as in the case

¹⁴ For a reasonable estimate of Xenophon's attitude to Sparta see J. K. Anderson, *Xenophon* (London, 1974), pp. 165–71.

¹⁵ Xenophon is silent on Thebes' role in the peace and Diodorus says that she remained out of it, but Isocrates' *Plataicus* indicates that both Plataea and Thebes were party to a Common Peace between 387/6 and 373/2. Thebes was a member of the Athenian Confederacy in 373 which would

have been impossible if she had not sworn to the peace of 375. See the arguments of Roos, (above, n. 2) which should be accepted. Diodorus is commonly assumed to be transferring the exclusion of Thebes from the peace of 371 to 375 but cf. S. Lauffer, 'Die Diodor Dublette D.S. XV.38–50 über die Friedensschlüsse zu Sparta 374 und 371 v. Chr', *Hist.* 8 (1959), 315–48. See also Ryder (above, n. 2).

of Plataea. Xenophon's apparently contradictory reference to Theban attacks on Boeotia after 375 must be seen in this light. The *Plataicus*, an Isocratean speech set in 373/2 and purporting to be the Plataean appeal to Athens also described by Xenophon, confirms that this recovery process was complicated. Thespieae is there described as having been forced to join Thebes before the appeal,¹⁶ and it would seem that Xenophon's reference to Thebes' threat to make her stateless must refer to a later stage in her takeover. If the same occasion was being described the discrepancy seems odd, since one would not expect the strongly anti-Theban *Plataicus* to minimize Theban atrocities by saying she was merely forced into the Confederacy when she was really threatened with destruction.

But the *Plataicus* also suggests that Plataea was not a member of the Confederacy at any time previous to the incident mentioned by Xenophon; in particular it mentions no previous alliance of any sort with Thebes when defending the Plataeans against the charge of laconism in the recent Boeotian War, when one would expect such a fact to be produced.¹⁷ However, it could also be said that a speech so strongly anti-Theban in tone would not be likely to dwell on the previous Theban successes in Boeotia before the peace.

Xenophon's interpretation of the peace from the Athenian side, namely that they wanted to undermine the growth of Theban power in Boeotia which their naval war against Sparta facilitated and also to gain relief from the excessive costs of that war (6.2.1), is also consistent with his presentation of the facts about Boeotia before the peace. Diodorus is in agreement with him on this aspect of the peace, that it was an attempt by Athens, and Sparta, to detach the Boeotian cities from the Theban Confederacy.¹⁸ It was designed to remove Theban, not Spartan, garrisons from those cities.¹⁹

Xenophon's narrative is consistent throughout, and this makes it unlikely that his reference to the Theban invasion of Phocis at 6.1.1 is an isolated error due to a doublet; moreover, no Theban invasion of Phocis is referred to before Leuctra, making a doublet even more unlikely. Accidental error of this sort can be ruled out. Yet it would be most uncharacteristic of Xenophon to distort the account in favour of Thebes by denying that Sparta still controlled part of Boeotia in 375 before the peace. My conclusion is that Thebes may have controlled Boeotia and invaded Phocis at that time, but that her control was very short-lived.

Beloch also questioned Xenophon's date of 375 for Jason's assumption of the leadership of Thessaly on the grounds that Jason's inactivity from then until the battle of Leuctra where he next appears, a period of four years, would be most unlikely.²⁰ However, Jason was unpopular in Thessaly and would have hesitated to engage in important activity with a disaffected national army behind him.²¹ Besides, this national army was largely untrained, especially the hoplite section,

¹⁶ *Plataicus* 9.

¹⁷ *Plataicus* 11–16.

¹⁸ D.S. 15.38.4. Just because Diodorus is wrong on the exclusion of Thebes from the peace of 375 it does not necessarily follow that he is also wrong on the status of the Boeotian cities at that time. See above, n. 15. He does refer to subsequent Theban attacks on Plataea, Thespieae, and Orchomenus but these could be part of the recovery of the cities after the peace had

delivered them from Thebes (15.46.4, 57). This would mean he actually contradicts himself on the matter of Thebes' participation.

¹⁹ The idea that the peace was designed to remove Spartan garrisons is held by Accame (above, n. 3), p. 146.

²⁰ Beloch, *Gr.G.* III.2, pp. 236–8.

²¹ *Hell.* 6.1.14; 6.4.32 and H. D. Westlake, *History of Thessaly in the Fourth Century* (London, 1935), pp. 107–8.

and several years might well have been needed to make an effective force of it.²² Even at Leuctra he prefers his well-trained and loyal mercenaries. In short, some time would have to pass after his assumption of the leadership before it was made operationally effective.

It has also been argued that statements made by Jason in his speech to Polydamas as reported by Xenophon (6.1.4–13) are anachronistic in the context of 375.²³

- (i) Jason claims he would never ally with the Athenians (6.1.10), yet epigraphical evidence can be used to suggest that he joined the Second Athenian Confederacy, and so was an ally, in 375.²⁴
- (ii) Jason claims that Alcetas of Epirus is subject to him (6.1.7), but epigraphical evidence seems to list Alcetas separately from Jason as a member of the Athenian Confederacy in his own right, and he is mentioned in literary sources as an ally of Athens at least equal to Jason in 373.²⁵

It should also be noted that what Jason says at 6.1.10, that the Boeotians and all the others engaged in war with Sparta are his allies if only he free them from Spartan control, seems anachronistic; it contradicts Xenophon's own statements on the recovery of Boeotia by Thebes in 375. The statement could apply if he is wrong about the Theban recovery but it should certainly not be used to disprove what he says in his narrative. The statement occurs in a speech designed to persuade, not in a straightforward narrative.

In fact the whole argument begs the vital question as to whether what Jason says is fact, or opinion, or propaganda. The aim and setting of the speech require examination.

Jason was a man of considerable military talent and also a cunning diplomat. This is shown by his handling of Thebes and Sparta after Leuctra to his own advantage (6.4.22–5). His talk with Polydamas also demonstrates this diplomacy. Jason's intention was to show Polydamas that he would do best to submit to him willingly since he was too powerful to resist, and to make submission an attractive prospect by offering to make him second in Thessaly after himself and showing what a powerful position that would be. He exaggerates his power and flatters Polydamas to this end.

To take first his distorted reference to Alcetas as a subject; this was most flattering to Polydamas, who saw the ruler of Epirus, a large kingdom, referred to as a lowly subject while he himself was being offered a much more exalted status (6.1.8). Jason also boasts that he will make the King of Persia subject as well and this would again flatter Polydamas and give him the impression that Jason's power was limitless. His claims about the King were in fact a gross distortion.²⁶

His implication (6.1.10) that the Boeotian cities were his allies if only he freed them from Sparta must be taken in its context. He includes in the category of those who would follow him if he freed them from Sparta all those who were at war with Sparta at that time, and the statement was clearly designed to impress upon Polydamas that he had many cities begging for his leadership if only he would act. Such a propaganda claim is liable to be a gross generalization.

²² Westlake, *op. cit.*, pp. 104–11.

²³ Accame (above, n. 3), pp. 91–8.

²⁴ IG II.2, 43, line 111 shows an erased space which is commonly assumed to have once held the name of Jason. Cf. A. G. Woodhead, 'IG II.2, 43 and Jason of Pherae',

AJA, 61 (1957), 367–73 but then cf.

Cawkwell (above, n. 2), p. 91 n. 60.

²⁵ Ps.-Dem. 49.10, and IG II.2.43, line 109.

²⁶ Westlake (above, n. 21), pp. 72–3, 116–19.

To which other cities does he refer? They are possibly Peloponnesian states like Mantinea and Phlius and cities like Olynthus which Sparta had been recently subduing (6.2–3), but it would be inaccurate to say that they were all at war with Sparta at the time. In fact the statement can be understood only as propaganda. The idea of liberation could always be used by a skilful propagandist.²⁷ He is very likely thinking more of these others than Boeotia when he refers to their being controlled by Sparta. He goes on to refer to his takeover of the Spartan land hegemony, i.e. the Peloponnese, and of Macedonia, and he may have the cities around Olynthus in mind there (6.1.10–11).

Jason also claims that the Athenians would do anything to be his allies but that he would never be their friend since he could take over their sea control even more easily than Sparta's land control, clearly trying to impress Polydamas. Yet his name occurs after that of his alleged subject Alcetas in the prosecution speech at Timotheus' trial, as if less important, and Xenophon does not refer to his help, only Alcetas', in transporting Athenian troops to Corcyra,²⁸ so that he seems wrong about the first part of his claim. Diodorus mentions Alcetas' alliance with Athens but not Jason's.²⁹ Also, if his name once appeared on the Charter of the Athenian Confederacy in a now erased line, and if it is associated with a group of cities whose alliances are dated to 375,³⁰ then the second part of his claim seems impossible in 375.

But it is doubtful that his name can be restored on the Charter with any confidence, and if that is so the argument about anachronism fails.³¹ Even if one persists in restoring it his adherence to the Confederacy is more likely dated to 373 than 375. The fact that Diodorus does not mention his alliance in 375 when Timotheus was in the North-West of Greece makes it unlikely that he joined then, and it would have been difficult to make contact with Thessaly from the North-West anyway.³² The only other likely date is 373 when Timotheus was in the Aegean and within easier reach. Timotheus and Jason had a special relationship, which suggests that he was responsible;³³ the alliance is mentioned for the first time in 373 and though that is not necessarily evidence that he was also a member of the Confederacy, it might tend to support it.³⁴ The style of the mason's work on the stone may connect the erased name which is allegedly Jason's with the group of Thracian and North-Western cities that precede it rather than with the largely Aegean group that follows, and that suggests a date of 375 since those cities are often connected with Chabrias' expedition to Thrace and Timotheus' to the North-West in that year, but this matter is still in doubt.³⁵ Even then, however, it is not certain that Timotheus won these Aegean cities in 373.³⁶ It is possible they joined him then,³⁷ but some assign them to 376 to 375³⁸ and others say they were inscribed in 373 but had joined earlier.³⁹ There seems to be no definite solution.

²⁷ Westlake, pp. 116–19.

²⁸ Ps.-Dem. 49.10 and *Hell.* 6.2.11.

²⁹ D.S. 15.36.5.

³⁰ See Accame (n. 3), pp. 91–103 for this view.

³¹ Woodhead (above, n. 24) but cf.

Cawkwell (above, n. 24).

³² D.S. 15.36.5. He mentions Cephalenia, Acarnania, and Alcetas as joining but strangely omits Corcyra.

³³ Ps.-Dem. 49.10. Polyaeus 3.9.40 is

too vague to make Iphicrates responsible for an alliance with Jason.

³⁴ Ps.-Dem. 49.10 and Woodhead (above, n. 24), p. 373.

³⁵ Woodhead (above, n. 24), pp. 371–2.

³⁶ Accame (above, n. 3), p. 101 n. 3 rejects a date of 373 BC.

³⁷ Marshall (above, n. 4), pp. 57–8.

³⁸ Accame (above, n. 3), pp. 99–100.

³⁹ Sealey (above, n. 1), p. 419.

I think it likeliest that Jason was not a member of the Confederacy in 375 and that his alliance is to be dated after this year, and that the claims made in his speech are not a reflection of the real situation in 375 but are for propaganda purposes. Perhaps it was because the question of his relationship was in the air that he took the trouble to deny it to Polydamas. There is then no difficulty in dating his assumption of the leadership of Thessaly to 375.

Xenophon's synchronisms seem sound and his account plausible up to the peace, which he appears to date to 375.

For a more precise dating the evidence concerning the cult of Peace established at Athens after the battle of Alyzeia and the peace that followed is of especial importance.⁴⁰ The scholiast to Aristophanes dates the celebration of a cult of Peace to 16 Hecatombaeon and this is usually identified with the later cult connected with the peace after Alyzeia.⁴¹ Thus the precise date of the peace would be about a month after the battle on 16 Hecatombaeon 375. However, a month would not leave enough time for the initiation and conclusion of peace negotiations after the battle, especially if the Persian King was responsible for the initiation of peace talks,⁴² and so the peace has often been dated to 16 Hecatombaeon 374 rather than 375.⁴³

There is a good argument against this objection to 375. It was not the battle of Alyzeia but the prospect of the Persian invasion of Egypt that provoked the Persian King to call for an end to the wars in Greece, so that he could recruit Greek mercenaries for his army more easily.⁴⁴ Peace initiatives could well have been made before Alyzeia as soon as the invasion of Egypt was envisaged. Now Diodorus dates the beginning of that expedition to the beginning of summer 374/3 and that should strictly refer to spring 373, although it could refer somewhat inaccurately (as is Diodorus' habit, especially when dealing with eastern affairs) to spring 374.⁴⁵ At the end of the expedition which lasted only a short time Iphicrates, who had commanded the Greek mercenaries, returned home to Athens and was appointed to the command of the fleet, a clear reference to his Corcyrean expedition, a short time afterwards. Since he sailed at a date that I shall argue was midsummer 373,⁴⁶ either date is possible, but 373 is more likely when there is no reason to reject Diodorus.

Diodorus also says that the Persian commander Pharnabazus had spent several years over his preparations for the campaign. This puts the date at which

⁴⁰ Isocrates 15.109–10; Philochorus *ap. Didymus* 7.62.

⁴¹ Scholiast to Aristophanes *Peace* 1017–20 and see Accame (above, n. 3), pp. 248–51.

⁴² D.S. 15.38 and Philochorus (above, n. 40).

⁴³ Again, Roos (above, n. 2).

⁴⁴ These mercenaries are indeed recruited and are found under the command of Iphicrates at D.S. 15.41.3.

⁴⁵ H. R. Hall, *CAH* VI (Cambridge, 1923), p. 149 and H. W. Parke, *Greek Mercenary Soldiers* (Oxford, 1933), pp. 105–6 date the invasion to 374 but Beloch, *Gr.G.* III.1, pp. 211–12 and H. Bengtson, *The Greeks and the Persians* (London, 1969), p. 348 date it to 373.

Diodorus is clear the invasion began at the beginning of the summer i.e. spring, that some time passed in the fight for the fort on the Mendesian mouth of the Nile, and that it ended when the Etesian winds were blowing and the Nile was flooding, a phenomenon that occurred also early in the summer according to Strabo 17.1.7. If a date of 374 were accepted for the beginning of the invasion there would be no possibility at all of a peace date of late 374, since the invasion would precede the peace and make nonsense of the King's motivation for calling for peace. The invasion must follow the peace. For Diodorus' confusion over the chronology of eastern affairs see 15.29.

⁴⁶ See below, pp. 316 ff.

the invasion was envisaged back to early 375 if by his reference to years in the plural Diodorus means at least more than one.⁴⁷ I suggest that peace initiatives, which were part of the preparations for the war, should also be put back to this date since the King would hardly have left these to the last minute. The battle of Naxos in late 376 had certainly given the Spartans reason to want peace, and this would also suggest a date of 376/5 for the initial peace proposals.⁴⁸ It was pure coincidence that the conclusion of peace followed close on Alyzeia, and it is surely significant that neither Xenophon nor Diodorus make a causal connection between that battle and the peace; only the pro-Athenian Isocrates seems to do that.⁴⁹

Therefore there is no objection to dating the peace to the second half of 375.

II: THE RENEWAL OF WAR

It has been mentioned above that Diodorus supplies information which suggests Xenophon is wrong to make the expedition of Mnasippus follow immediately after the incident at Zacynthus. He also contradicts him by putting the expedition of Timotheus before that of Mnasippus in his narrative. His order of events is as follows:⁵⁰

- (i) Timotheus lands exiles on Zacynthus and fights with them against the Zacynthians; they appeal to Sparta and Sparta denounces Timotheus at Athens; getting no favourable response Sparta sends a fleet of 25 under the command of Aristocrates to the area
- (ii) Sparta also sends a fleet of 22 under the command of Alcidas to Corcyra, intending to take it over by supporting the pro-Spartans but alleging that the fleet is destined for Sicily so that it will be received into the harbour in friendly fashion
- (iii) The attempt on Corcyra is abortive; Corcyra appeals to Athens for aid; Athens sends Ctesicles to Zacynthus, who appealed for aid at the same time as Corcyra, and prepares a fleet for that state
- (iv) At the same time Thebes destroys Plataea and Thespieae
- (v) Timotheus is sent to Corcyra but sails to Thrace instead; he is too late to help Corcyra which has meanwhile been attacked by Mnasippus; Ctesicles is sent out with a force of 500 peltasts
- (vi) Timotheus is reinstated after being deposed for his delay in helping Corcyra and sails there with Iphicrates

The controversy over the order of the expeditions of Mnasippus and Timotheus is interesting and important in its own right. It also has repercussions for dating the peace. The date of Mnasippus' expedition and therefore his nauarchy actually helps us to determine the date of the peace, as will be seen.

It seems to me that the pivot of the dating of Mnasippus' expedition is the

⁴⁷ D.S. 15.41.2.

⁴⁸ Cawkwell (above, n. 2), p. 90.

⁴⁹ Neither of the historians gives much space to Alyzeia. Xenophon is also sketchy on the battle of Naxos, concealing its importance in winning allies for the Second

Athenian Confederacy and treating only its immediate military significance as a way of relieving the Spartan blockade of Athens (5.4.61). But Diodorus attaches a great deal more importance to Naxos (15.34.3–35).

⁵⁰ D.S. 15.45–7.

date of Iphicrates' arrival at Corcyra. This is synchronized by both Xenophon and Diodorus with the main battle on Corcyra in which Mnasippus was killed and it therefore marks the end of the Spartan siege.⁵¹ On this point at least the two accounts are in agreement. At the time Iphicrates arrived Mnasippus had been at least two months on the island, and possibly more, since he owed some of his mercenaries two months' wages at the time of the battle which is synchronized with Iphicrates' arrival (6.2.16). There is no reason to doubt this part of Xenophon's account. Iphicrates would not have taken more than a few weeks at the most to arrive, and possibly less, since Xenophon stresses his haste;⁵² and so there seems to be a gap of about two months between the expedition of Iphicrates and that of Mnasippus. It may have been more but it certainly was not less.

Xenophon says that the Athenians elected Iphicrates general immediately after the deposition of Timotheus and that he sailed with all haste, a statement so clear and forceful that it cannot be lightly dismissed (6.2.13). He stresses that concern for haste right through his account of the voyage (6.2.14–32) and there seems no good ground to question it. He also says that the Athenians deposed Timotheus because he was wasting the peak of the sailing season: *νομίζοντες αὐτὸν ἀναλοῦν τὸν τῆς ὥρας εἰς τὸν περίπλουν χρόνον*, explaining the motivation that lay behind the official charge that he had not sailed around the Peloponnese according to orders.⁵³ His use of the present tense *ἀναλοῦν* implies that at the time of the deposition a part of the sailing season still remained. Once again there seems no reason to doubt Xenophon's intended meaning. The sailing season is commonly identified with the summer and the peak should be at its mid-point in June/July. It is probable that the deposition occurred very soon after that time to make Xenophon's statement understandable. Thus if Iphicrates sailed very soon after Timotheus' deposition he would sail in perhaps July/August of 373 but not much later than that.

Timotheus was not tried until Maemacterion, leaving a gap of several months between the deposition and trial, but this is not unlikely.⁵⁴ The presence of Alcetas and Jason at the trial attests to some delay since they would have to be sent for,⁵⁵ and the influence of Timotheus' powerful friends and relatives might have been able to put off the trial until the situation on Corcyra improved.⁵⁶ It has been argued and accepted that Iphicrates was present at the trial, and if this is so he could not have sailed to Corcyra in midsummer; but the evidence on which this is based does not rule out the possibility that he was responsible for the initial denunciations of Timotheus in the Assembly which led to his deposition and left a more practised politician, Callistratus, to proceed with the actual trial.⁵⁷ It is inconceivable that Timotheus' fleet lay idle all summer until the trial with such an urgent crisis on Corcyra and when keeping the fleet together was such a costly business. Xenophon implies that Iphicrates manned Timotheus' fleet of 60, added ten more to the total, and sailed immediately.

Xenophon's subsequent account of Iphicrates' activity on Corcyra after his

⁵¹ D.S. 15.47.7 and *Hell.* 6.2.31.

⁵² See A. W. Gomme, *Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, I (Oxford, 1970), p. 20, and I, 103.4 n.

⁵³ Ps.-Dem. 49.9 and *Hell.* 6.2.13.

⁵⁴ Ps.-Dem. 49.22.

⁵⁵ Ps.-Dem. 49.10.

⁵⁶ See Ps.-Dem. 49.10 for their presence and support.

⁵⁷ Ps.-Dem. 49.9 for the role of Callistratus.

arrival is consistent with a sailing date of midsummer or a little later. He says that Iphicrates supported the crews by having them work on the land for the Corcyreans, a possibility likeliest on Corcyra, which had suffered the ravages of an invading army, in the late summer when there was planting to be done for the following year.⁵⁸

Mnasippus' expedition must be put back at least two months from this, giving a date of May/June 373 at the latest and perhaps even earlier. In that case Mnasippus must be nauarch for the year 374/3 since the Spartan nauarchy term ran from autumn to autumn. This has very important implications for the dating of the peace and indeed for the whole chronological outline of these years.⁵⁹ If Mnasippus was nauarch for 374/3 he would normally have commanded the Spartan fleet on an expedition unless he was engaged elsewhere. But the commander of the expedition to Zacynthus was Aristocrates and not Mnasippus. This suggests that the Zacynthian incident could not have occurred in the year of Mnasippus' nauarchy, 374/3, or Mnasippus would have led it. It must have occurred in the previous year 375/4 when Aristocrates was nauarch.⁶⁰ Now both Xenophon and Diodorus date the Zacynthian incident after the peace; if that incident is to be dated to 375/4 then the peace also must be dated to this year, and if a date of 16 Hecatombaeon is required for the peace then the only possible year seems to be 375.

There are further implications for the chronology of these years. If the Zacynthian incident occurred in 375/4 then so did the Corcyrean incident involving Alcidas, since Diodorus synchronizes the two. This is confirmed by the contemporaneous appeals to Athens from these two areas.⁶¹ But if that Corcyrean incident is dated to 375/4 how could Timotheus, who did not sail until spring 373, possibly be answering an appeal which arose from that incident and was dated a full year earlier? If he was not sent to answer that particular appeal on what occasion was he sent? The only other possibility seems to be the occasion of Mnasippus' attack on Corcyra, and this vindicates Xenophon's version of these events and his order of the expeditions. It seems time to examine the worth of Diodorus' tradition on this matter. A close examination in fact reveals an internal contradiction in the account.

Diodorus begins his account with a statement on the effects of the peace of 375/4 in the North-West of Greece: confusion and stasis in the cities there, caused by their new-found autonomy, led to faction which brought in the two major powers, Athens and Sparta, and ultimately the renewal of war.⁶² The incidents at Zacynthus and Corcyra which he then relates as illustrations of this effect are not viewed by him as part of the war but preliminaries to it. The war did not really begin until the Spartans attacked Corcyra under Mnasippus. There is sure evidence that peace lasted up until then, since the Spartans negotiate at Athens over Timotheus' alleged breaking of the peace, and the Spartan fleet

⁵⁸ *Hell.* 2.1.1 indicates that this sort of employment was available only in the summer, that is until the onset of winter.

⁵⁹ For the date of the assumption of the nauarchy and the length of its term see Beloch, *Gr. G.* II.2, pp. 269–89 and H. Michell, *Sparta* (Cambridge, 1952), pp. 277–80.

⁶⁰ Beloch (above) dates the nauarchy of Aristocrates to this year.

⁶¹ D.S. 15.45–6. A contemporaneous reply was made by Athens to Zacynthus and Corcyra, so that the appeals must also have been contemporaneous.

⁶² D.S. 15.45.1–2.

expects to be received in friendly fashion at Corcyra, an expectation that would be quite ridiculous if the peace had then been broken.⁶³

The Zacynthian incident could not have occurred long after the peace or the presence of Timotheus in the area would be inexplicable. He would not have stayed there long after the peace because of the heavy cost of the fleet, which was now unnecessary (5.4.66; 6.2.1), and he would surely not have stayed out over the winter.⁶⁴ The incident is to be dated to 375. The Zacynthian appeal against Timotheus, and Spartan denunciation of him at Athens, must have followed swiftly and the dispatch of the fleet under Aristocrates would not be long delayed; certainly Diodorus implies no delay. The Corcyrean appeal occurred at about the same time as the Zacynthian incident and Spartan reaction was immediate: Alcidas was sent. The appeals to Athens from Zacynthus and Corcyra must have followed fast upon the Spartan intervention. Athens sent Ctesicles out to Zacynthus directly and the preparations for a fleet for Corcyra would result in a similarly speedy dispatch of Timotheus to the area. Diodorus' narrative suggests no delay between any of these events. His relative chronology suggests that Timotheus sailed at the end of 375 or the start of 374 at the latest. Yet we know that he in fact sailed in spring 373, and so we must interpose a full year's delay between the Corcyrean appeal against Alcidas and the expedition of Timotheus that is alleged by Diodorus to have answered it. The account does not make sense. Although he states clearly that Timotheus sailed some time before Mnasippus against Alcidas, it cannot be the case; his aid to Corcyra would be far too late and his voyage therefore unmotivated. The threat from Alcidas had soon passed away and the Spartan fleet sailed on to Sicily, leaving Corcyra in peace. Timotheus was not sent out on that occasion but on another, when Mnasippus attacked. Diodorus or his source has confused the two Corcyrean incidents and Xenophon's account is vindicated.

A date of 374 for the peace solves some problems but creates others. The Zacynthian and Corcyrean incidents could then be dated just after the peace in late 374, and the subsequent appeal from Corcyra could be plausibly answered by Timotheus the next spring. Aristocrates would be nauarch for 374/3, Mnasippus nauarch for 373/2, and the latter would sail in the autumn of 373 after his appointment. Timotheus would be deposed as soon as the Athenians heard of Mnasippus' attack. By this chronology, however, Timotheus would not be deposed until quite late in the sailing season when very little of it was left, which would go against Xenophon's careful implication that a good part of it remained, a statement we have no need to doubt. Moreover, at least two months would have to pass while Mnasippus was on Corcyra before Iphicrates could sail and arrive there. Yet this implies a delay of two months between Timotheus' deposition and Iphicrates' sailing date, which contradicts Xenophon's clear evidence about the latter's rapid succession to the generalship and his speed on the journey. Xenophon had no special love of Iphicrates, that he should lie about his speed (as his criticism of him at 6.5.49–51 shows). It should also be remembered that Diodorus dates the peace to 375/4, not 374/3 in any case, and this is the date Xenophon also implies. Diodorus also dates Mnasippus' expedition, which is one of the central events of that year, to 374/3, not 373/2.

The only remaining evidence that Mnasippus sailed after Timotheus comes

⁶³ D.S. 15.45.4; 46.2.

⁶⁴ *Hell.* 5.4.66 and 6.2.1 confirm that

money was a major worry to the Athenians before this peace.

from the *Plataicus*. This is set in early 373/2⁶⁵ at a time when Timotheus at least had definitely sailed, but in it there are constant references to a state of peace existing in Greece and one specific implication that Athens and Sparta were not then at war.⁶⁶ This suggests that at that time Mnasippus had not attacked Corcyra and that he therefore sailed after Timotheus and in 373/2.

However, the definition of the time at which a war begins is not a straightforward matter.⁶⁷ It is debatable whether an attack on an ally is the beginning of war since there has to be a response from the other side; and it is arguable that war begins when the two parties to the war, in this case Athens and Sparta, were actively engaged in fighting against each other. Ctesicles and his force of peltasts, who were very likely foreign mercenaries and not Athenians,⁶⁸ fought Mnasippus in autumn 373 only and in any case were not a major Athenian force. Timotheus was sent but never arrived, and Iphicrates, when he did arrive, engaged only Spartan allies, the small fleet from Syracuse, not the Spartan army. The Plataeans might have referred to peace in Greece right up to the time at which Iphicrates carried out his planned raids on Laconia the following year, since that would be the first time that Spartan and Athenian forces had clashed in battle. Mnasippus' attack did not mean that war had begun, but that it was likely; and that likelihood of war seems to be what the Plataeans are playing on when they use the threat of war with Sparta to make Athens accept their appeal and revenge their injustices.

There is nothing surprising in the fact that Diodorus dates to 374/3 the events of the previous year, and that he places the destruction of Plataea and the expedition of Iphicrates in 374/3 when they actually occurred in 373/2. His errors are explained by the difficulty of adapting his non-annalistic source, Ephorus, to an annalistic framework. It is usually agreed that Ephorus organized his history on a subject system, treating a given theme rather than just a given number of years, in a given book. It is also agreed that as far as possible he treated the history of Greek, Eastern, Sicilian, and Roman affairs in separate books. That would be impossible to follow where Greek and Eastern affairs merged as they often did, but it was a principle underlying the work. There is disagreement as to how far he did away with any system of marking the years, especially for his modern history, but it is generally assumed that it was not at all regular. He did use synchronisms of battles and other major events in different parts of the world. I would also assume that if he is the source for Diodorus' account of the Persian invasion of Egypt in 374/3 he also used seasonal indications, although these do not appear to have been at all regular. It was because of this that Diodorus had such trouble trying to sort out events into archon years, consular years, and Olympiads, the precise methods of dating that he used in his universal history.⁶⁹

⁶⁵ See Pausanias 9.1.3–8 who puts the attack on Plataea in early 373/2 but implies that the whole affair began a little earlier in 374/3.

⁶⁶ *Plataicus* 1,5,17,43.

⁶⁷ A. Momigliano, 'La Pace del 375 a.C. e il Plataico di Isocrate', *Atti. N.S.* xiv (1936), 3–35, esp. 29.

⁶⁸ See J. G. P. Best, *Thracian Peltasts and their Influence on Greek Warfare* (Groningen, 1969), H. W. Parke, *Greek*

Mercenary Soldiers (Oxford, 1933) as well as J. K. Anderson, *Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon* (California, 1970), although none mention these peltasts specifically.

⁶⁹ Here I follow G. L. Barber (above, n. 10) esp. Chs. I, II, and Appendix II. Cf. on Ephorus' organization of his history R. Drews, 'Diodorus and his Sources', *AJP* 83 (1962), 382–92, but I am not convinced for the period 275–371 BC that Ephorus used an

I think one can see signs of this difficulty in Diodorus' narrative of 375 to 371. First, he gives the correct date for the conclusion of the peace but not for its initiation, compressing the account of the negotiations into one year. He then proceeds to an illustration of the effects of the peace in two major areas: the Peloponnesian states and the North-West of Greece, where he develops the theme of stasis and the wars it produced. Diodorus seems to me to be preserving the essentially thematic treatment of Ephorus but splitting the two areas into different archon years, putting the wars in the Peloponnese under 375/5 and the wars in the North-West under 374/3. Between them he inserts the Persian invasion of Egypt which, if the general assumptions about Ephorus' work are right, was treated in a separate book on Eastern affairs. After an account of the preliminaries to the war, the Zacynthian and Corcyrean incidents, he does not proceed directly to Mnasippus' expedition but relates the Theban attack on Plataea, synchronizing it with the preliminaries to the war. If Diodorus is the close copyist of Ephorus that we believe him to be then Ephorus himself was probably responsible for this synchronism. Yet it seems wrong because it links events of 375/4 to an event of 374/3 or 373/2. On the other hand, all three events are linked thematically, since they all involve an appeal to Athens for aid. The story of the preliminaries to the war ends with the twin appeals from Zacynthus and Corcyra; this theme is immediately picked up with the reference to the Plataeans sending to Athens for troops according to the alliance. It seems possible that the common thematic interest has brought with it a common dating and that this error is due to Ephorus' concern with themes rather than a year by year account.

Ephorus then passed to Mnasippus' expedition. His omitting the passage of the years is suggested by the way in which Diodorus puts the whole war from Mnasippus' attack to Iphicrates' expedition under the same year 374/3, although Iphicrates sailed in 373/2. Diodorus' archon year 373/2 is filled up instead with floods and earthquakes in the Peloponnese which are used to make moralizing points.⁷⁰ The account of the peace of 371 follows under its correct year. It seems that Diodorus is simply chopping up Ephorus' continuous account into a few central events datable with the aid of his epitome,⁷¹ and fitting other events into his archon years as best he can. The dates of comparatively minor events like the preliminaries to the war, Timotheus' abortive expedition, and Iphicrates' rather inconsequential one, might not be included in an epitome and Diodorus would be left to his rather feeble devices; but the dates of central events like the conclusion of peace in 375 and 371 as well as Mnasippus' attack on Corcyra would be included.

On the order of the expeditions of Timotheus, it remains only to consider the plausibility of Xenophon's account, which has been challenged on several points.⁷² It has been objected that Timotheus' delay is incomprehensible if Mnasippus had already sailed, and that financial difficulties are not a satisfactory

annalistic method. On the parts of the narrative that Diodorus may be adding himself see Drews and R. K. Sinclair, 'Diodorus Siculus and Fighting in Relays', *CQ* N.S. 16 (1966), 249–55. See E. Schwarz on Diodorus in *R.E.*.

⁷⁰ D.S. 15.49–50.

⁷¹ E. Schwarz (above, n. 69).

⁷² Cawkwell (above, n. 2) has made the most recent objections.

explanation. It is true that in 375 on his previous expedition to Corcyra Timotheus had managed to sail directly there with very meagre financial resources,⁷³ and if simple lack of cash was the problem in 373 as well we would expect him to do the same. But in 373 the problem was more complicated. What prevented Timotheus from sailing was the refusal of the trierarchs to co-operate with him in getting the ships to sea, and this is confirmed by the fact that Iphicrates was able to get the fleet under way by coercing the trierarchs and forcing them to do their duty (6.2.14). He continued to use threats against them during the expedition, with good results (6.2.34), so that it appears the problem was not restricted to the first part of the journey. To get the fleet to sea without the co-operation of the captains was a difficult business since they were responsible for the recruitment and the quality of the crews in the fourth century.⁷⁴ It is significant that Xenophon says Timotheus sailed to the islands for crews because he thought it a serious matter to engage a fleet of the quality of the Spartan (6.2.12); he also points out that Timotheus had been unable to man his fleet at Athens. Perhaps the trierarchs had been unable or unwilling to make an effort to search for the sort of crews Timotheus thought he needed for this expedition. It did not occur to him that he might have trained inferior crews *en route* to Corcyra, as Iphicrates did. Besides, it was the trierarchs and others of the wealthy classes at Athens who had suffered most in the recent war with Sparta, which had proved so expensive (6.2.1), and they might well have been unwilling to start another after the year or more of pleasant peace.

The reason why the Athenians waited until the peak of the season to depose him could be a certain amount of sympathy for his financial difficulties and other problems. It even seems possible that Ctesicles was sent out as a stopgap measure, in anticipation of Timotheus taking some time to get the fleet prepared.

A date of midsummer for Iphicrates' expedition makes no great delay between the Spartan request for Syracusan aid and the arrival of the Syracusan fleet at about the same time as Iphicrates. This part of Xenophon's account also seems plausible. There is a suspiciously long delay only if Iphicrates' expedition is dated to late 373 or 372.

The lack of naval action at Corcyra during the course of the siege is another feature of Xenophon's account which has provoked suspicion. But it could well be accounted for by the severe stasis in the city mentioned by Diodorus which made the organization of a naval action difficult and perhaps even dangerous; the pro-Athenian masses would form the crews on the ships, leaving their city vulnerable to the treachery of those who favoured Sparta. This was especially so when the Spartans had control of the land already.

The real fault of Xenophon's narrative is simply lack of sufficient information. He is correct as far as he goes on Athenian motives for making peace in 375 but he fails to mention the role of Persia or the participation of Thebes. On other occasions where he describes peace negotiations which involved most of Greece

⁷³ Isocrates 15.109 says Timotheus had only 13 talents for his previous expedition to Corcyra in 375.

⁷⁴ For fourth-century evidence that recruitment of good crews depended on the enthusiasm of the trierarchs as much as on rates of pay see Dem. *On the Trierarchic Crown* 6 and *Against Polyces* 6–7, where the

trierarch could easily have recruited an incompetent crew from those offered him on the demarch's register but chose rather to search elsewhere for crews of better quality. An uncooperative trierarch could easily produce inefficient crews which a commander like Timotheus might reject.

as well as the Persians he can be very full and detailed, even where they were abortive.⁷⁵ It seems necessary to put his silence on this occasion down to reasons other than lack of interest. On the incidents which led up to the war he is certainly defective although it is unnecessary to say that he omits the Corcyrean affair in order to make a direct link between the Zacynthian incident and Mnasiippus' expedition and thus blame Timotheus for the breakdown of peace. Diodorus damns Timotheus far more effectively by saying that he actually fought with the exiles on Zacynthus whereas Xenophon says only that he landed them there and implies that he then sailed straight back to Athens.⁷⁶ Xenophon could also be accused of suppressing facts favourable to Timotheus in his account of his Aegean activities: the winning of new allies for the Confederacy; the collection of more ships for the fleet; but this depends on whether Diodorus' glowing account is to be trusted.

The account Diodorus gives of what Timotheus did in early 373 is strongly Athenian-biased, a feature not at all unexpected when his source is Ephorus, a writer of notorious pro-Athenian tendencies.⁷⁷ There are also many signs of partisan treatment: his statement that the Athenians granted equivalent citizenship to the Plataeans because of the nobility of the demos;⁷⁸ his giving the Athenian Ctesicles two victories on Corcyra rather than one as in Xenophon, who has far more convincing detail about the fighting;⁷⁹ his crediting Ctesicles with killing over 200 in the first battle;⁸⁰ and his quite erroneous reinstatement of Timotheus after his deposition. This reflects well on him and the Athenians, who were magnanimous enough to have a change of heart and admit they were wrong but is contradicted by other contemporary evidence, including Xenophon who names Chabrias and Callistratus as Iphicrates' colleagues.⁸¹

Xenophon says virtually nothing of what Timotheus did in early 373 and seems to imply that he was simply looking for crews (6.2.13), but Diodorus says that he added many cities to the Athenian alliance and thirty ships to his fleet. However, he mentions none of these cities by name. The epigraphical evidence attests that many Thracian cities joined Athens during these years but they are usually associated with Chabrias' expedition to Thrace in 375. The cities normally associated with Timotheus in 373 are Aegean rather than Thracian,⁸² although even then there is debate as to whether they are indeed a result of this expedition.⁸³ Yet Diodorus implies that the cities he won were from the Thracian region, not the Aegean. Xenophon at least indicates that it was the island area Timotheus visited. It is possible that the account is biased in favour of Timotheus and that his achievements are greatly exaggerated (see below, p. 325). The Athenians also appear in a favourable light, not only in the matter of the reinstatement, but in their lavish equipping of a further 40 vessels for Timotheus. In view of the financial difficulties of these years at Athens this is quite unlikely.⁸⁴

One last question remains to be considered, the reliability of those parts of Diodorus' account with which we are forced to supplement Xenophon's.

The information on the expeditions of Aristocrates and Alcidas before the

⁷⁵ Compare *Hell.* 5.1.30–6; 6.5.1–3; 7.1.27, and esp. 7.1.33–40.

⁷⁶ D.S. 15.45.3.

⁷⁷ See Barber (above, n. 10), pp. 88–100, and esp. 100–1.

⁷⁸ D.S. 15.46.6.

⁷⁹ D.S. 15.47.6.

⁸⁰ D.S. 15.47.6.

⁸¹ Ps.-Dem. 49.25 and *Hell.* 6.2.39.

⁸² IG II.2.43, lines 112 ff. The only Thracian cities mentioned are Selymbria and Neapolis.

⁸³ Accame (above, n. 3), pp. 100–3.

⁸⁴ D.S. 15.47.4.

outbreak of war seems acceptable enough. The account contains little specific detail apart from the numbers of the fleets involved but that may well be due to Diodorus' abbreviation of his source. The interest in these events seems to be political rather than military since they are treated primarily as examples of how autonomy led to anarchy and war throughout Greece. Very little is said of the fighting which ensued, especially at Zacynthus where there is a surprising silence. Xenophon is also aware of such political themes as this and develops a similar political analysis of the results of a later peace granting autonomy to the Peloponnesian cities (6.5.3 ff.), but his idea of the cause of the war in 375/4 is a superficial one, the action of Timotheus and the aggressive response of Sparta to it.

Diodorus' account of Mnasippus' exploits on Corcyra is similar to Xenophon's but not nearly as detailed, again possibly as the result of abbreviation. However, it contains two battles not found in Xenophon, one for control of the harbour which seems to contradict Xenophon, who does not say that the Spartan fleet entered the harbour (6.2.7), and another for the control of a hill position which Xenophon says was taken by the Spartans but, apparently, without a fight (ibid.). Diodorus' source, Ephorus, had a reputation in antiquity as a poor military historian.⁸⁵ He also was capable of creating battles where they did not originally exist. In the account of the Spartan King Agesilaus' campaign in Asia in 395 the author of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, from which Diodorus derived his account via Ephorus, describes the fighting near Sardis as taking the form of an ambush.⁸⁶ But by the time Diodorus inherited the tradition from Ephorus there was a full-scale battle as well as an ambush and it seems that Ephorus alone is responsible for the creation of this battle. Indeed the great battle is the mark of the Ephorean battle account.⁸⁷

Therefore it would not be too surprising if the two new battles in the account of Mnasippus' exploits were Ephorean fiction. However, the main reason why I am unwilling to accept these battles is the wealth of detail in Xenophon about the fighting from the Spartan side. It is almost inconceivable that he would not have known about these battles had they occurred, and such is his interest in Sparta that he would surely have written them up, if he had known.

In Diodorus' account of the exploits of Ctesicles there is another battle not reported by Xenophon in which 200 on the Spartan side died; this occurred before the main battle which Xenophon mentions. However, Xenophon does record a minor skirmish which occurred before the main battle and actually led into it, and it is very possible that Ephorus has created a full-scale battle out of a tradition of such a skirmish, and this has passed into Diodorus. Of course Diodorus adopts the standpoint of Ctesicles and the Corcyreans inside the city in describing the fighting but he gives no military details to supplement Xenophon's account, even though Xenophon adopts the Spartan standpoint only. Where Diodorus does give valuable information to supplement Xenophon is the detail on the stasis at Corcyra, which we would simply not be aware of if we were to rely totally on Xenophon. This is the real virtue of Diodorus.

It seems that the merits of Diodorus' account are political rather than military and this is confirmed by signs in the narrative that his source was far from being

⁸⁵ Barber (above, n. 10), pp. 141-4.

1967), Appendix I.

⁸⁶ I. A. F. Bruce, *Historical Commentary on the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* (Cambridge,

⁸⁷ Barber (above, n. 10), p. 143.

a military man. The terminology is almost invariably wrong or vague when he comes to speak of military things: Mnasippus who is rightly called nauarch by Xenophon is here plain general; the 1,500 mercenaries in the field with him are here plain soldiers, not mercenaries; the 600 peltasts mentioned by Xenophon are again plain soldiers; the ships from Syracuse become here, more vaguely, ships from Sicily.⁸⁸

Another area where Diodorus supplies extra information is the matter of numbers and names. He puts Mnasippus' total force at 1,500 but on this at least he is wrong. First, Xenophon says that there were 1,500 mercenaries as well as men from Sparta (6.2.5). Secondly, in the main battle he distinguishes two groups of soldiers, hoplites, who seem quite numerous and are referred to as all the hoplites he had with him, and the mercenaries, who were filling in for those Spartan allies who did not participate personally in the campaign (6.2.18). Sparta had not demanded personal service because this was an overseas expedition, but some allies nevertheless were present at Corcyra, although the majority had sent cash instead (6.2.16). These allies must certainly have lifted the numbers above the 1,500 mentioned by Diodorus.

On the number of ships with Mnasippus Xenophon gives a round figure of about 60 while Diodorus is more precise with 65. He gives another round figure of about 600 for the troops with Ctesicles while Diodorus is again precise with 500 exactly. Diodorus' precisions contrast with Xenophon's approximations but are not necessarily proof of greater accuracy. In fact the figure of about 600 peltasts with Ctesicles has an air of conviction about it since it is in proportion to the 60 ships voted at the same time. Other examples of this sort of proportionate voting are found in Xenophon at 1.4.21; 4.2.17-10; 4.8.25-8, and this may count in Xenophon's favour.

The figure of 9 Diodorus gives for the ships captured by Iphicrates agrees with the number in Xenophon who also notes that there were originally 10 ships in the Syracusan fleet but that one escaped and was not taken by Iphicrates. Against this is one new piece of information that Diodorus provides: there were two commanders of this fleet, Crinippus whom Xenophon mentions, and Cissides whom he does not. This is a convincing piece of detail because the man named later turns up in Xenophon's account as the leader of another small Syracusan fleet sent to help Sparta in 368 BC (7.1.28).

Diodorus also says that Iphicrates raised the sum of 60 talents from the sale of prisoners from the Syracusan fleet and this seems a plausible sort of figure if one reckons on about 200 crew in each ship as well as officers and men.⁸⁹ Xenophon gives no figure. Diodorus goes on to say that the fleet was paid with this sum of money, and this presents no difficulties either if one follows his account. He implies that the fleet was 130 strong by the time Iphicrates set sail,⁹⁰ and this could have been paid with that sum, at fourth-century

⁸⁸ D.S. 15.47.1, cf. *Hell.* 6.2.4; D.S. 15.47.1, cf. *Hell.* 6.2.5; D.S. 15.47.4, cf. *Hell.* 6.2.10; D.S. 15.47.7, cf. *Hell.* 6.2.35.

⁸⁹ This produces a figure of about 2 minae per man which is well within the slave price range given in *Slavery in Classical Antiquity* (Cambridge, 1960), ed. M. I. Finley, p. 5. (= A.H.M. Jones, 'Slavery in the Ancient World', *EHR* 2nd s. 9 (1956),

p. 189.)

⁹⁰ D.S. 15.47.2-4 produces the number 130. At about a half-drachma per man per day or a little less 60 talents would cover a month's pay for this fleet. A. H. M. Jones, *Athenian Democracy* (Oxford, 1967), p. 32 gives a reasonable estimate of fourth-century rates of pay for seamen.

rates of pay, which were by no means the drachma a day per crew member that they had been during the Peloponnesian War.⁹¹ However, Xenophon says that the fleet that sailed with Iphicrates was only 70 strong and that is a major contradiction (6.2.14). This part of Diodorus may be biased (see p. 322), and the figure of 130 is suspect. It is made up of the original fleet of 60 ships with which Timotheus left Athens, 30 allied ships which he is supposed to have brought back with him from the Thracian area, and another 40 allegedly voted by Athens after his deposition. Yet in the prosecution speech against Timotheus, which seems to be very well informed on his movements in 373, only Boeotian ships, not Thracian or Aegean ones, are mentioned as being with him at the end of his expedition;⁹² moreover, financial difficulties at Athens in this year, which Diodorus totally ignores, make it most unlikely that the Athenians were able to equip another 40 ships beside the original 60. Diodorus' account takes no account of this financial factor, a grave shortcoming of the tradition preserved by him through Ephorus.

It is possible that Ephorus himself is responsible for pro-Athenian distortion in the account, but more probably he was using pro-Athenian sources. One source that he may have used for the period under review is Callisthenes, although there is some doubt whether his history began before the battle of Leuctra; very little is known about him.⁹³ He could also have used political pamphlets and other non-historical sources as well as personal knowledge since he lived c. 405 to 330 and spent his maturity at Athens, where he seems to have been associated with Isocrates.⁹⁴ Now Timotheus was a favourite pupil of Isocrates, as a brief look at the *Antidosis* reveals, and Isocrates was known to have written propaganda for his pupil during this period.⁹⁵ It seems possible that Ephorus' source for the account of Timotheus' expedition might well have been such a political pamphlet emanating from the school of Isocrates, which might account for the distortion in it.

Ephorus' sources for the other parts of his account of 375 to 371 include Callisthenes, but beyond that little else is known. I am unwilling to believe that personal observation played any part, although he would have had access to Athenian sources and might have witnessed events at Athens. There is none of Xenophon's fine detail and visual quality in Diodorus' account, although such detail does not always indicate personal observation and allowance must be made for the effects of abbreviation. Ephorus may have relied heavily on Callisthenes for most of the narrative on Theban and general Greek affairs, incorporating the odd political pamphlet and giving it a pro-Athenian standpoint. His account of the events of the late fifth and early fourth century as preserved by Diodorus is often radically at odds with Xenophon's and, because of this, use of Xenophon by Ephorus is ruled out.⁹⁶ Yet Diodorus' account of the campaign from Mnasippus' point of view could well be derived from Xenophon's with the characteristic addition of the two battles for the hill and the harbour. His account of the campaign from Ctesicles' point of view could well be a rationalization of

⁹¹ See A. W. Gomme, A. Andrewes, K. J. Dover, *Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, IV (Oxford, 1970), 6.31.3 nn.

⁹² Ps.-Dem. 49.14, 21.

⁹³ See Barber (above, n. 10), pp. 131-3, who believes that the history of Callisthenes

began in the 370s and cf. F. Jacoby, *R.E.* on Callisthenes.

⁹⁴ Barber op. cit., pp. 1-3.

⁹⁵ Ps.-Plut. *Lives of the Ten Orators*, *Isocrates*, 9.

what Xenophon says of the fighting on Corcyra, with the characteristic addition of an extra battle created out of an original skirmish, and of an Athenian view-point also characteristic of Ephorus. The account from Iphicrates' point of view contains nothing major that is not in Xenophon's account. Ephorus could well have used Xenophon along with other sources, since he published that part of his history with which we are concerned after 335⁹⁷ some years after Xenophon's publication of his sixth book in which the events of 375 to 371 occur.⁹⁸ There is no chronological difficulty, and Xenophon is extremely full on the military side of the Corcyrean campaign.

Moreover there is one point where I am convinced Ephorus' account was derived from Xenophon: the figure of 1,500 given by Diodorus as the total of the forces with Mnasippus, but by Xenophon as the total of the mercenaries only. One likely way in which this error has been made is a careless copy of Xenophon's account, an error easily made when he fails to specify the number of the other troops with Mnasippus. Admittedly there is no linguistic resemblance between Diodorus and Xenophon but allowance must be made for abbreviation of Ephorus, and besides it does not seem to have been Ephorus' practice to preserve the original language of his source.⁹⁹ In short, Ephorus' ultimate use of Xenophon for the military part of the campaign cannot be ruled out, although it is clear that for political events he went elsewhere.

Xenophon was living in banishment from Athens at Scillus in the Peloponnese at the time the events he relates occurred. He had been installed there by the Spartans, with whom he presumably had some sort of contact.¹⁰⁰ This may have given him access to first-hand sources for the Spartan side of the Corcyrean campaign although not apparently for the Zacynthian or first Corcyrean incident. His relations with Athens were less cordial but he seems to have found out some very specific details about Iphicrates' expedition. Some suppose that he witnessed the fleet sailing along the coast of the Peloponnese and had contact with it at Elis.¹⁰¹ He is at any rate well informed on the military side of the Corcyrean campaign from both points of view. It is possible to adopt the view that Xenophon was not a diligent researcher and that his omissions are due to varying degrees of ignorance but his findings about Iphicrates' activities in 373/2 and the way in which he praises him twice for the conduct of the expedition (6.2.32, 39) surely indicates a special interest, not confined to watching from the Peloponnese or waiting subsequently for what news came his way. On the political aspect of the events of 375 to 371 his account is defective, and this must be put down to ignorance.

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⁹⁶ Barber, pp. 64–5, 131.

⁹⁷ Barber, pp. 11–13.

⁹⁸ *Hell.* 6.4.37 was written after the death of Alexander of Pherae in 358/7, thus dating the writing of this book, in which the events of 375–371 occur, to after that time. Publication of this part of the *Hellenica* is

normally dated to the 350s.

⁹⁹ See Barber, pp. 179–81.

¹⁰⁰ J. K. Anderson (above, n. 14), pp. 165–71.

¹⁰¹ E. Delebecque, *Essai sur la vie de Xenophon* (Paris, 1957), p. 301.